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et al.: FRE and NY Evidence Comparison

RULE 803(8)(C): PUBLIC RECORDS AND
REPORTS
Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8)(C) states:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even
though the declarant is available as a witness:
(8) Public records and reports. Records, reports, statements, or
data compilations, in any form, of public offices or agencies,
setting forth... (C) in civil actions and proceedings and against
the Government in criminal cases, factual findings resulting from
an investigation made pursuant to authority granted by law,
unless the sources of information or other circumstances indicate
lack of trustworthiness. 1
The principal justifications for Federal Rule of Evidence
803(8)(C) are twofold. First, there is a presumption that a public
official will perform his duty in a proper fashion, thus making
public records and reports trustworthy. 2 Second, such a hearsay
exception is convenient because it is unlikely that a public official
will remember intricate details of a record or report without the
3
help of a written record.
The dilemma in analyzing what kind of record and report
evidence should be admitted under Federal Rule 803(8)(C) was
based upon the interpretation of the words "factual finding." Two
diametrically opposed interpretations of these words emerged
during Congress' committee hearings on the rule. The House
Committee stated that the phrase "factual findings" should be
given a strict interpretation such that opinions or evaluations
found in public reports would not be admissible under the

1. FED. R. EviD. 803(8)(C). See also MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE

§§ 295-300, at 507-13 (John William Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992); JACK B.
WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE 1 803(I)[01].
at 86-95 (Joseph M. McLaughin ed., 1995).
2. Gentile v. County of Suffolk, 129 F.R.D. 435 (E.D.N.Y. 1990). The

court held that a report of a Temporary Commission of Investigation, which
found that the police department and the district attorney's office failed to
adequately supervise personnel, was trustworthy under 803(8)(C). Id.
at 458.
3. Id.
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803(8)(C) hearsay exception. 4 The Senate Committee, however,
stated that the House Committee's interpretation was too narrow
and subverted the Advisory Committee's intent. 5 The Senate
Committee concluded that a broader interpretation would
"assumef admissibility in the first instance of evaluative
reports," but such reports would still be subject to inadmissibility
6
if the source of the report lacked trustworthiness.
Rule 803(8)(C) was extensively analyzed by the United States
Supreme Court in Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 7 to determine
whether the rule should extend to "conclusions" and "opinions"
contained in public records and reports. 8 In Beech, the evidence
sought to be admitted was an investigative report which included
opinions and conjectory hypothetical scenarios concerning the
possible causes of a plane crash. 9 The Supreme Court chose the
broader interpretation of the rule in accordance with the Senate
Committee's suggestion, and held that investigatory reports
stating conclusions and opinions are admissible under

803(8)(C). 1 0
The Court's central argument in favor of a broad interpretation
rested on the actual language of the rule, as well as the Advisory
Committee's Note to the rule, 11 neither of which call for a

4. H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 14 (1973), reprinted in
1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7075,7088.
5. S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1974), reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051, 7064.

6. Id.
7. 488 U.S. 153 (1988).
8. Id. at 156.
9. Id. at 157.
10. Id. at 170. The court stated that "[a]s long as the conclusion is based
on a factual investigation and satisfies the Rule's trustworthiness requirement,
it should be admissible along with other portions of the report." Id. See United
Airlines, Inc. v. Austin Travel Corp., 867 F.2d 737, 742-43 (2d Cir. 1989)
(holding that the district court's refusal to admit governmental reports due to
their untrustworthiness in the area in which they were being reported as well as
the determination that the reports were "interim or inconclusive nature" was
completely within the discretion of the district court).
11. FED. R. EVID. 803(8)(C) advisory committee's note (discussing the
justification for this hearsay exception; public records are assumed to be
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distinction between "fact" and "opinion" in public records or
reports. 12 In further support of their decision, the Court stated
that drawing a distinction between "fact" and "opinion" would
be problematic because the difference between a fact and an
opinion is only a matter of degree. 13 The Supreme Court's
rationalization for adopting an interpretation of the rule which
would presume admissibility was the existence of an "ample
provision for escape" if the surrounding circumstances indicated
14
untrustworthiness from the source:
That "provision for escape" is contained in the final clause of the
Rule: evaluative reports are admissible "unless the sources of
information or other circumstances indicate lack of
trustworthiness." This trustworthiness inquiry - and not an
arbitrary distinction between "fact" and "opinion" - was the
Committee's primary safeguard against the admission of
unreliable evidence, and it is important to note that it applies to
all elements of the report. 15
The New York courts have not dealt with the admissibility of
public records and reports with the same conviction as the
Supreme Court. The present law in New York is vague, with
some decisions adopting a broader Supreme Court type of
analysis, and others adopting a narrow interpretation of the
hearsay exception. Public records and reports can generally be
admitted into evidence in New York in one of two ways. First,
they can be admitted under section 4520 of the Civil Practice
Law and Rules [hereinafter C.P.L.R.]. 16 However, admitting
admissible "in the first instance" since a "public official will perform his duty
properly" and be unlikely to "remember details independently of the record.").
12. Beech, 488 U.S. at 168.
13. Id.

14. Id. at 167 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 803(8)(C) advisory committee's
note).
15. Id.
16. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L & R. 4520 (McKinney 1992). Section 4520 states:

Where a public officer is required or authorized, by special provision of
law, to make a certificate or an affidavit to a fact ascertained, or an act
performed, by him in the course of his official duty, and to file or
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public records through C.P.L.R. section 4520 is extremely
17
difficult based upon the restrictive language of the statute.
Second, public records and reports can be admitted under New
18
York's common law hearsay exception.
New York's common law does not take a similar approach to
the United States Supreme Court in Beech with regard to the
public record hearsay exception. New York has been hesitant to
admit reports containing "opinions" and "conclusions" that
Federal Rule 803(8)(C) allows. 19
New York does not generally admit conclusions or opinions in
criminal cases. In People v. Hampton,20 the defendants were
charged with manslaughter for allegedly beating their four-yearold daughter to death. 2 1 The court refused to admit into evidence
an autopsy report stating an opinion as to the child's cause of
death. 22 The court held that the autopsy report constituted an
deposit it in a public office of the state, the certificate of affidavit so
filed or deposited is prima facie evidence of the facts stated.
Id. See In re Petition of Zurich-American Ins. Co., 89 A.D.2d 542, 543, 452
N.Y.S.2d 633, 634 (1st Dep't 1982) (reversing the trial court's decision to
admit results of a Department of Motor Vehicles search that was not filed in a
public office nor could it be defined as a public document in compliance with
CPLR § 4520).
17. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L & R. 4520 (McKinney 1992). This statute
"creates a hearsay exception for certain records prepared by public officers."
Id. The public record must meet several requirements: (1) the record must be
made by a public officer; (2) it must be in the form of a "certificate" or
"affidavit"; (3) the record must be required or authorized "by special provision
of law"; (4) it must be made in the course of the officer's official duty; (5) it
must be a record of a fact ascertained or an act performed by the officer; and
(6) it must be on file or deposited in a public office of the state. Id.
18. See People v. Hoats, 102 Misc. 2d 1004, 1010, 425 N.Y.S.2d 497,
501 (County Ct. Monroe County 1980). ("Under the common law exception,
when a public officer is authorized by the nature of his official duty to keep
records of transactions occurring in the course of his duty, the record so made
by him ...

is admissible in evidence.").

19. Randi M. Simanoff, Comment, Distinctions Between the Public
Records Exception to the Hearsay Rule in Federaland New York Practice, 11
TouRo
20.
21.
22.

L. REv. 195, 215-16 (1994).
38 A.D.2d 772, 327 N.Y.S.2d 961 (3d Dep't 1972).

Id.
Id. at 773, 327 N.Y.S.2d at 962.
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admissible public record; however, opinions regarding the cause
of death contained in such a report were not admissible under the
23
hearsay exception.
New York also extends its restrictive view of admissible public
records to civil suits. In Stevens v. Kirby,24 the plaintiff sued a
tavern owner for negligence for injuries which he received when
he was involved in a fight in the defendant's parking lot.2 At
trial, the plaintiff sought to introduce evidence that the county
deputy sheriffs had responded to four prior incidents at the
defendant's tavern, and that the prior calls had resulted in the
arrest of tavern patrons for disorderly conduct. 26 Although the
evidence of the prior calls was included in a State Liquor
Authority Report, the court refused to admit the police reports
underlying the Liquor Authority's report because "they contained
hearsay statements relevant to ultimate issues of fact not within
27
the personal knowledge of the sheriff deputies."
There are some New York decisions, however, that lean
toward the broader Supreme Court interpretation of the public
record hearsay exception. For instance, in Kozlowski v. City of
Amsterdam, 28 the decedent committed suicide after being
incarcerated for driving while intoxicated. 29 The Medical Review
Commission of the State Commission of Corrections prepared a

23. Id. See People v. Violante, 144 A.D.2d 995, 996, 534 N.Y.S.2d 281.
283 (4th Dep't 1988) ("while the autopsy findings are admissible to establish

the primary facts stated therein, opinions as to the cause of death contained in
such report are not admissible").

24. 86 A.D.2d 391, 450 N.Y.S.2d 607 (4th Dep't 1982).
25. Id. at 391, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 609.
26. Id. at 392, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 609.
27. Id. at 395, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 611. See Kelly v. Diesel Constr. Div. of
Carl A. Morse Inc., 35 N.Y.2d 1, 8, 315 N.E.2d 751, 754, 358 N.Y.S.2d
685, 690 (1974) (allowing into evidence an elevator inspector's accident report
but disallowing the superintendent's opinion as to the cause of the accident
which was contained therein because the superintendent was not authorized to
make such a treatment).
28. 111 A.D.2d 476, 488 N.Y.S.2d 862 (3d Dep't 1985).
29. Id. at 476-77, 488 N.Y.S.2d at 863.
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report pursuant to statutory authority, 30 which concluded that the
defendant failed to maintain proper supervision of the decedent
after incarceration. 3 1 The court held that the document was
admissible under the public document common law exception
since the document was statutorily mandated, relevant and

properly prepared. 32 Similarly in Lichtenstein v. Montefiore
Hospital and Medical Center,33 the court held that a hospital's

record, which contained a doctor's opinion that a patient had
committed suicide, was admissible. 34 In admitting the evidence,
the court stated that the hospital's judgment was "related to the

hospital's business of diagnosis and treatment just as much as the
determination by the hospital of any other cause of death of a
patient where that cause is related to, or even refutes, the

diagnosis of the condition for which the patient was under
treatment. " 35

New York also has a third mechanism which allows opinions
and conclusions into evidence: the business/official records
exception under C.P.L.R. section 4518.36 Because of the narrow
30. Id. at 478, 488 N.Y.S.2d at 864. The report was prepared in
compliance with Correction Law § 47. N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 47 (McKinney
1987). Section 47(1)(a) specifies that the duties of the board shall include the
duty to "[ilnvestigate and review the cause and circumstances surrounding the
death of any inmate of a correctional facility." N.Y. CORRECT. LAW
§ 47(1)(a) (McKinney 1987). The Board also has a duty to submit a written
report on its findings pursuant to § 47 (1)(d). N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 47(1)(d)
(McKinney 1987).
31. Id. at 478, 488 N.Y.S.2d at 864.
32. Id.

33. 56 A.D.2d 281, 392 N.Y.S.2d 18 (1st Dep't 1977).
34. Id. at 285-86, 392 N.Y.S.2d at 21-22.
35. Id. at 286, 392 N.Y.S.2d at 21-22.
36. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. 4518 (McKinney 1992). Section 4518
provides in pertinent part:
(a) Any writing or record, whether in the form of an entry in a book or
otherwise, made as a memorandum or record of any act, transaction,
occurrence or event, shall be admissible in evidence in proof of that act,
transaction, occurrence or event, if the judge finds that it was made in
the regular course of any business and that it was the regular course of
such business to make it, at the time of the act, transaction, occurrence
or event, or within a reasonable time thereafter ....
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scope of C.P.L.R. section 4520 and the common law public
records exception, most police reports are admitted into evidence
as business records through C.P.L.R. section 4518. 37 This is
unlike the federal courts, which consider police reports to be
public records. 38 New York's use of C.P.L.R. section 4518
results in the admission of some opinion and conclusion evidence
in accord with the Supreme Court's ruling in Beech. 39
It is evident that New York is faced with the same dilemma in
interpreting the common law that Congress faced when
interpreting Rule 803(8)(C). Thus, while the federal courts
permit public records containing opinions and conclusions into
evidence through 803(8)(C), New York courts restrict such
admissions to a few narrow situations.
Id. See Stein v. Lebowitz Pine View Hotel Inc., 111 A.D.2d 572, 489
N.Y.S.2d 635 (3d Dep't 1985). Plaintiff brought action for wrongful death
against hotel owners when her husband drowned in the swimming pool of their
hotel. Id. at 572-73, 489 N.Y.S.2d at 637. The court found that the contents of
the file maintained by the decedent's physician and his staff were admissible
under 4518(a). Id. at 574, 489 N.Y.S.2d at 638.
37. Simanoff, supra note 19, at 221.
38. Simanoff, supra note 19, at 221.
39. Simanoff, supra note 19, at 209 (stating since New York's public
record exception to the hearsay rule is only based on two narrow sources
[CPLR 4520 and the common law], "CPLR 4518 is the most common
mechanism that a New York attorney will utilize when seeking to admit public
records under a hearsay exception." Id. at 209).
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